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A
ccording to the Business Cycle Dating
Committee of the National Bureau of
Economic Research, the nation’s record-
long business expansion ended in March 2001,
exactly 10 years after it started. Much of the down-
turn in the growth of U.S. economic activity dur-
ing 2001 can be traced to a sharp decline in busi-
ness purchases of information processing equip-
ment and software, otherwise known as high-tech
capital goods. This investment bust came on the
heels of a boom in spending on those same types
of capital goods over the latter part of the 1990s.
Although business fixed investment spending
tends to be pro-cyclical, this time the boom and
bust was unusually large. One explanation for the
boom and bust that has not been explored in
much detail was the surge in business purchases
of hardware and software in preparation for the
century date change (hereafter, Y2K). Was the
boom due to efforts by firms to upgrade their
computer hardware and software? Likewise, was
the bust caused by the cessation of Y2K-related
capital spending?
RECENT TRENDS IN BUSINESS FIXED
INVESTMENT SPENDING
In the national income and product accounts
(NIPA), nonresidential investment (or business fixed
investment [BFI]) comprises investment in structures
and investment in equipment and software (E&S).
Over the past 25 years, fixed investment in structures
as a share of total BFI has dropped from about 33
percent to 27 percent, so that, accordingly, business
investment in E&S as a share of BFI has grown from
about 67 percent to about 73 percent. Figure 1 shows
that there has been a marked shift in the composi-
tion of E&S investment since 1977.1 Business expen-
ditures on E&S investment are classified under four
categories: (i) information processing equipment
and software (IPES), (ii) transportation equipment,
(iii) industrial equipment, and (iv) other. In 1977,
each amounted to roughly 17 percent of total BFI.
By mid-2000, IPES investment as a share of BFI
had grown to a little less than 36 percent, while the
remaining components had smaller shares than
they did in 1977.
Figure 2 shows that increased spending on
software accounted for the bulk of the increase in
IPES investment spending. From 1977 to late 2001,
the share of software investment rose from a little
more than 15 percent to nearly 47 percent. Over
this period, the share of fixed investment in com-
puters rose markedly less, from about 15 percent
to about 18 percent.
In terms of its contribution to real GDP growth,
the investment boom in the high-tech sector was
largely a phenomenon of the late 1990s. Real IPES
investment grew at a little more than 12 percent per
year from 1990 to 1995. This rate of growth acceler-
ated to a little more than 19 percent per year from
1995 to 2000, so that by the fourth quarter of 2000
it was at an all-time high as a share of BFI (Figure 1).
Not surprisingly, the contribution to real GDP growth
from IPES, as seen in Table 1, increased measurably
during the latter half of the 1990s. From 1990 to
1995, growth of BFI contributed 0.4 percentage
points of the 2.3 percent growth per year of real
GDP. From 1996 to 2000, though, the contribution
of real BFI jumped to 1.2 percent per year, a bit less
than a third of the 4.0 percent per year growth of
real GDP. During this period, the largest contribution
to real BFI growth stemmed from E&S investment
(averaging 1.0 percentage points). The contribution
from business structures, industrial, and transporta-
tion equipment was relatively small. 
Beginning in the second half of 2000, businesses
started to scale back their purchases of most types
of capital goods—not just high-tech equipment
and software (IPES). Indeed, over the four quarters
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1 Because chain weights do not have the additive and multiplicative
properties of fixed weights, it is not correct to express shares in real
terms. Thus, Figure 1 expresses shares in current (nominal) dollars.
See Whelan (2000).of 2001, real fixed investment in business structures
fell 10.6 percent, about the same as the decline in
IPES investment (10.5 percent); real investment in
E&S fell less, roughly 9 percent. As seen in Table 1,
of the 3.7-percentage-point decline in real GDP
growth from 1996-2000 to 2001, nearly half (1.6
percentage points) stemmed from the swing in E&S
investment, with IPES investment comprising the
bulk of that (1 percentage point).
CONVENTIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF
THE INVESTMENT BOOM AND BUST
Firms will invest (i.e., purchase capital equip-
ment) in order to increase their future profit oppor-
tunities. Hence, a firm’s decision to invest will depend
on its projection of those future profit opportunities
(expected future returns) and the cost of making
the investment (cost of capital). In terms of explain-
ing the recent investment boom and bust, it might
be useful to consider two competing explanations.
One explanation is that the investment boom may
have simply been a cyclical phenomenon. That is,
expected returns to investment rose as economic
growth accelerated. Moreover, rapidly advancing
technology and declining prices of information
technology goods lowered the cost of capital for
high-tech capital goods relative to other capital
goods, boosting investment in information process-
ing and communications equipment.
Another explanation suggests that the invest-
ment bust came about as aggregate demand growth
weakened in 2000 and 2001 in response to the
sharp declines in equity prices, especially those of
technology stocks. Second, expected returns during
the latter part of the 1990s may have risen because
of problems associated with Y2K. That is, the oppor-
tunity cost of not fixing potential computer and
software problems was high. Failure to fix the prob-
lems may have resulted in disruptions to business
activity and, hence, lower profits. Once these Y2K
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NOTE: Shares expressed in current (nominal) dollars.problems were addressed, the expected returns
were zero and these types of investment ceased.
Was There Excess Investment During
the 1990s?
The substantial decline in investment spending
beginning in late 2000—both high-tech and non-
high-tech—led some to conclude that firms over-
invested in capital goods during the latter part of
the 1990s.2 Excess investment is usually thought
of as the amount of capital goods (in the aggregate)
that exceeds the amount that businesses require to
produce the existing demand for goods and services.
In the context of the firm’s investment decision
noted above, it is useful to think of excess invest-
ment as the result of firms overestimating future
profit opportunities (expected returns) in the present
relative to the existing cost of capital. During the
latter half of the 1990s and into early 2000, excess
investment may have occurred because firms
expected the rapid rate of aggregate growth to
persist longer than it did.
Figure 3 provides some evidence that there may
have been excess business investment in IPES. In
Figure 3, the levels of real IPES investment are
indexed to 100 for each of the post-World War II
business cycle peaks (excluding the 1980 and 2001
peaks). The average of these indexed levels is plot-
ted (solid line), as is the indexed level for the most
recent period (2000-01)(dotted line). Relative to pre-
vious peaks (as defined by the National Bureau of
Economic Research), IPES investment was excep-
tionally strong just before the 2001 recession,
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Real BFI Contributions to Real GDP Growth (Percentage Points)
1970-79 1980-89 1990-95 1996-2000 2001
Real GDP Growth 3.3 3.0 2.3 4.0 0.3
Contributions from:
Nonresidential fixed investment 0.6 0.4 0.4 1.2 –0.7
Structures 0.1 0.1 –0.1 0.2 –0.1
Equipment and software 0.5 0.3 0.5 1.0 –0.6
Information processing 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.7 –0.3
Computers and peripherals 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0
Software 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0
Other 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 –0.2
Industrial equipment 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 –0.1
Transportation equipment 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 –0.2
Other 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
NOTE: Percentages are averages of years indicated (subject to rounding errors).
Table 1
2 In some circles, this was termed a “capital overhang.” See Council of
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NOTE: The shaded area represents the range of previous recessions.before falling off considerably.3 In fact, the figure
suggests that the high-tech investment boom and
bust of 2001-02 was the largest in the post-World
War II period. 
There are other ways to ascertain whether there
was excess investment toward the end of the 1991-
2001 expansion. One method is to compare the
desired aggregate capital stock to the actual capital
stock (the linkage between the two, of course, is
investment spending). A difficulty with this approach
is that the desired capital stock can only be estimated
from an econometric model.4 Another method of
ascertaining whether excess investment occurred
is to calculate the percentage deviation of the actual
34 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003
4 Macroeconomic Advisers (2002) found that the actual stock of IPES
capital exceeded the desired stock by a little more than 6 percent during
the fourth quarter of 2000 (the largest deviation of the 1991-2001
expansion). This estimate was calculated prior to the 2002 annual
revisions of the NIPA data.
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Was There Excess Investment During the 1991-2001 Expansion? (Percentage Deviations from Trend)
Business Industrial  Transportation 
Expansion period structures IPES equipment equipment Residential
1961:Q2 to 1969:Q4
Average deviation –0.44 –0.97 –0.87 0.17 –0.73
High 8.56 10.59 9.48 13.07 13.23
Low –8.55 –9.98 –13.90 –15.08 –22.99
High – Low 17.11 20.58 23.39 28.15 36.22
1970:Q4 to 1973:Q4
Average deviation 1.07 1.45 –3.29 –1.25 8.40
High 8.77 9.29 11.74 16.11 18.41
Low –3.46 –5.41 –12.01 –32.48 –8.64
High – Low 12.23 14.70 23.74 48.59 27.05
1975:Q1 to 1980:Q1
Average deviation –3.48 –3.23 –1.66 –0.26 0.03
High 5.64 4.09 9.11 16.58 15.43
Low –10.03 –13.34 –9.26 –23.53 –35.85
High – Low 15.66 17.43 18.37 40.12 51.28
1982:Q4 to 1990:Q3
Average deviation –0.40 0.86 –0.20 0.44 2.04
High 8.48 7.99 8.89 8.96 8.29
Low –14.77 –15.28 –16.41 –19.93 –29.61
High – Low 23.25 23.26 25.30 28.89 37.91
1991:Q1 to 2001:Q1
Average deviation –1.01 –0.95 –1.04 –0.97 –1.33
High 5.65 4.77 4.86 10.06 8.13
Low –6.45 –6.17 –9.27 –15.69 –20.73
High – Low 12.10 10.94 14.13 25.75 28.86
NOTE: Percentages are calculated as deviations from trend in chain-weighted dollars. The trend value is estimated from the Hodrick-
Prescott algorithm. See footnote 5. Sample period for Hodrick-Prescott calculations is 1947:Q1 to 2001:Q1 for all categories except
IPES, which begins in 1959:Q1.
Table 2
3 IPES data are available only back to 1959 at a quarterly frequency.
Calculations exclude the short 1980 recession.level of real fixed investment from the trend level.5
Table 2 shows these percentage deviations for real
fixed investment in business structures, IPES, indus-
trial equipment, transportation equipment, and
residential investment for each U.S. business expan-
sion since 1960. 
One aspect of the typical business expansion
that is seen from Table 2 is that real investment is
highly volatile. This is illustrated by the difference
between the high and low percentage deviations
from trend (at a quarterly frequency). In the 1982-90
expansion, for example, real IPES investment relative
to its trend ranged from –15.3 percent to +8.0 per-
cent. Even larger percentage deviations from trend
were seen in previous expansions and among other
forms of fixed investment. Thus, if a large, positive
percentage deviation from trend is viewed as a sign
of excess investment, excessive investment during
the 1991-2001 expansion was atypical in that it was
comparatively mild. The largest positive deviation
occurred in transportation equipment (10.1 percent).
This was relatively small compared with the devia-
tion in the 1961-69, 1970-73, and 1975-80 expan-
sions, but it exceeded the deviation in the 1982-90
expansion. For the 1991-2001 expansion, positive
deviations from trend of similar size were noted in
business structures, industrial equipment, and resi-
dential fixed investment. Thus, it does not appear
that excess IPES investment was particularly note-
worthy. The largest positive percentage deviation
from trend occurred in the second quarter of 2000,
but it was small (4.77 percent) compared with pre-
vious expansions, such as the 1961-69 (10.59 per-
cent) and 1982-90 (7.99 percent) expansions.
While the evidence from Table 2 suggests that
the investment boom in the 1990s was not excessive,
the data from Table 1 nonetheless show that the
surge in BFI spending contributed appreciably to
real GDP growth. One popular explanation for the
recent investment boom is the acceleration in labor
productivity growth beginning around 1995, which
some have dubbed the “New Economy” story and
which ties in with the rise in corporate equity prices
in the latter half of the 1990s.6
The New Economy Story
Beginning around 1995, prices for computers
and peripherals began to fall sharply. After falling
an average of 12.8 percent per year from 1990 to
1994 (annual data), computer prices fell an average
of 24.1 percent per year from 1995 to 1999. Bol-
stered by falling prices, expenditures (output) on
high-tech capital goods rose sharply.7 From 1995
to 2000 (annual data), production of high-tech
equipment rose an average of roughly 40 percent
per year, after growing an average of a little more
than 21 percent per year from 1990 to 1995.8 The
increased amount of high-tech capital equipment
available to workers (capital deepening) raised their
labor productivity.9
A potential key impetus behind the investment
boom during this period was the sharp rise in corpo-
rate equity prices. All else equal, rising equity prices
lower the (equity) cost of capital, which, by lower-
ing the hurdle rate that separates profitable from
unprofitable investments, spurs firms to increase
their level of fixed capital investment (and output).
Figure 4 indicates that corporate equity prices during
the late 1990s rose the most among those publicly
traded firms generally thought of as both users and
producers of information technology (IT) capital
goods such as computers, semiconductors, and soft-
ware. From October 8, 1998, to March 10, 2000, the
technology-heavy Nasdaq composite index rose
nearly 260 percent to just under 5050. Over the
same period, the Wilshire 5000 index rose from
about 8,621 to a little more than 13,952, an increase
of about 62 percent; while noteworthy, this increase
is a far cry from 260 percent. The larger increase in
the Nasdaq composite index (decline in the cost of
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7 Pakko (2002) tackles the thorny issue of whether improvement in the
quality of high-tech capital goods—as reflected in the sharp declines
in relative prices of computers and other information technology
equipment—was overstated. If true, this would overstate the growth
of real capital spending. He finds that generally not to be the case.
8 High-tech is defined as non-energy output of computers, communica-
tions equipment, and semiconductors. See the Federal Reserve Board’s
G.17 statistical release (Industrial Production and Capacity Utilization).
9 Surveying five prominent studies, Stiroh (2002) found that the contri-
bution of IT-related investment—both the production and use of IT
capital goods—explained a substantial portion of the roughly 1-
percentage-point acceleration in the growth of labor productivity from
1973-95 (1.4 percent) to 1995-99 (2.4 percent). These studies use a
production-function framework to estimate the contribution of the
change in labor productivity growth stemming from (i) capital deepen-
ing, (ii) labor quality, and (iii) total factor productivity. Three of the five
studies found that the dominant contribution arose from an accelera-
tion in total factor productivity growth that was largely due to IT-related
effects.
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5 The trend was calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, a statistical
smoothing algorithm used to estimate the long-term trend component
of a time series. The Hodrick-Prescott filter removes movements that
are thought to arise merely from changes associated with the business
cycle. The calculation here was done in EViews Version 4.0.
6 See Greenspan (1998).capital) relative to the Wilshire 5000 index is con-
sistent with the figures reported in Table 1, which
show that the acceleration in BFI was the largest in
the IPES segment.
Beginning in March 2000, markets began to
reassess their estimates of future profitability in the
IT sector. This is seen by the steep decline in the
Nasdaq composite index in Figure 4. By September
10, 2001, the Nasdaq had fallen to just under 1,700,
giving up most of the gains seen over the past three
years. As the equity cost of capital in the IT sector
began to rise sharply, demand for high-tech goods
began to wane. Accordingly, manufacturers of high-
tech capital goods began to scale back production:
From October 2000 to September 2001, output of
IT capital goods fell 16 percent. And since (nominal)
investment in business E&S had risen to about 10
percent of GDP in 2000, the subsequent fall in the
demand for these products led to a sharp decelera-
tion in output growth (see Table 1).
As seen in Figure 5, the Nasdaq composite
index peaked much earlier (March 2000) than did
production of high-tech capital spending (December
2000), though the growth of high-tech output began
to decelerate markedly in May. Although the timing
suggests that the plunge in the Nasdaq may have
been a significant factor behind the high-tech invest-
ment bust, it does not readily explain the decline
in non-high-tech investment spending.10 Although
the Wilshire 5000 index also peaked in March 2000,
real BFI in transportation equipment peaked much
earlier, in the third quarter of 1999, while real fixed
investment in structures peaked in the fourth quarter
of 2000 and industrial equipment during the first
quarter of 2001.
McCarthy (2001) attempted to ascertain whether
falling equity prices could explain the investment
boom and bust in E&S (a mix of high-tech and non-
high-tech capital goods). To test this hypothesis,
McCarthy used a series of one-step-ahead forecasts
(from the first quarter of 1995 to the second quarter
of 2001) derived from a standard neoclassical model
of business investment, which was augmented with
a measure of equity market valuation (Tobin’s Q).
He found that the model did a reasonably good job
of predicting the growth of real E&S fixed investment
spending from 1995 into early 2000.11 Beginning
in mid-2000, though, the model substantially under-
predicted the falloff in capital spending. Using a
counterfactual exercise that assumed equity values
grew from 1995 onward at their 1980-94 pace, he
36 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003
10 Moreover, recall from the discussion of Table 2 that the largest percent-
age deviation of IPES investment from trend occurred in the second
quarter of 2000.
11 McCarthy’s estimates were derived prior to the July 2002 annual NIPA
revisions.
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Figure 4found that the model predicted E&S investment
would have still grown at a double-digit pace, but
that the drop in equity prices exerted some drag on
fixed investment growth. In particular, he found
that real E&S investment growth would have been
about 4 percentage points higher if the stock market
had not fallen as it did.12 Furthermore, McCarthy
found a larger effect from the sharp drop in equip-
ment prices over the latter half of the 1990s, which
he attributes to weak demand. If so, then one poten-
tial source of weak demand may have been the end
of the expenditures by businesses to fix the so-called
Y2K computer bug.
CAN Y2K EXPLAIN THE INVESTMENT
BOOM AND BUST?
One explanation of the high-tech investment
boom and bust that has received relatively scant
attention centers on the surge in spending by private
businesses to ready themselves for Y2K.13 The “Y2K
problem,” as it was called, was viewed by some
government entities as “potentially extremely seri-
ous,” given the computer’s predominant role in
large industrialized economies.14 According to
industry figures cited by the U.S. Department of
Commerce in July 1998, almost 90 percent of all
firms with fewer than 2,000 employees had not
started Y2K “remediation projects” as of 1997. More-
over, nearly half of all personal computers shipped
in 1997 were not Y2K compliant.15 Some economists
went so far as to predict a “severe” global recession,
arising from widespread disruptions to, for example,
the air transportation system, electrical grids, the
financial infrastructure, and government services.16
To prevent these disturbances from materializing,
the private sector began to devote a considerable
amount of resources to fixing the problem. One
manifestation of this was the upsurge in payroll
employment in computer and data processing ser-
vices. As seen in Figure 6, year-over-year growth
throughout much of 1999 was quite strong, reaching
nearly 17 percent in August. This rapid growth, how-
ever, was not historically large, as evidenced by the
much stronger growth seen during the late 1970s
and early 1980s.
Public policymakers were also devoting con-
JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003      37
14 Council of Economic Advisers (1999, p. 77).
15 Bachula (1998).
16 Edward Yardeni, now at Prudential Securities, was the chief alarmist
on the Y2K issue. See Matthews (1998).
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12 McCarthy also ran a counterfactual exercise that assumed relative
prices of E&S capital goods from 1995 onward fell at a constant rate
equal to their 1980-94 average. In this counterfactual forecasting
exercise, he found that the model does a better job of forecasting the
investment bust in 2000-01.
13 The 2002 Economic Report of the President states on p. 36 that some
of the 2000-01 slowdown reflected the “lingering effects” of Y2K. siderable time and resources to minimizing the Y2K
problem. The Federal Reserve System, anticipating
a precautionary surge in the demand for cash by
households, formulated a “temporary financing
facility” designed to ensure that sufficient liquidity
existed for the banking system around the time of
the century date change. Part of this effort included
a large increase in the supply of currency to deposi-
tory institutions.17
Perhaps because of the preventative efforts
undertaken by the public and private sector before-
hand, most forecasters evidently were of the opinion
that the Y2K problem would not be a significant
macroeconomic event. Still, some precautionary
spending was expected to occur. According to the
panel of Blue Chip forecasters in July 1999, real GDP
growth in the second half of 1999 was expected to
be boosted by a buildup of business inventories by
firms and an upswing in purchases of nondurable
goods by households. This effect was expected to
be relatively small, though: In the May 1999 Survey
of Professional Forecasters, nearly 60 percent of
forecasters expected the assorted Y2K effects to
boost real GDP growth by 0.1 to 0.5 percentage
points in 1999. In 2000, as these temporary effects
reversed, about half of the forecasters expected an
effect on real GDP growth of between 0.0 and –0.4
percentage points. The net effect was expected to
be essentially zero, and, at first glance, the end-of-
year Y2K disruptions to the aggregate economy
turned out to be minimal.
The alarmists turned out to be wrong about a
Y2K-inspired worldwide depression; nevertheless,
the high-tech investment boom and bust shortly
before and after the century date change suggests
some causality. Table 3, which replicates the Hodrick-
Prescott framework of Table 2, indicates that the
investment bust—as seen by the largest negative
percentage deviation from trend (low)—was espe-
cially large for IPES. During the 2001 recession, IPES
investment at one point was 13.68 percent below
trend, which was surpassed only by the severe
1981-82 recession. The average deviation of IPES
investment during the 2001 recession (–7.22 percent),
however, was much larger than in the previous reces-
sions listed. Table 3 also shows (compared with
previous recessions) a large negative deviation for
transportation equipment (–10.5 percent), but not
for industrial equipment (–2.95 percent) or residen-
tial fixed investment (–1.88 percent). 
The evidence in Table 2 shows that the largest
positive deviation in real IPES investment spending
from trend during the 1991-2001 expansion was not
unusually large (compared with previous expan-
sions). This finding suggests that Y2K spending was
probably not that significant during the investment
boom. However, the evidence from Table 3 is at least
consistent with the conjecture that a cessation of
business spending on Y2K fixes may have exacer-
bated the sharp decline in IT investment spending.
To see whether the end of Y2K was responsible for
the high-tech investment bust, it will be useful to
look at the estimated amount of Y2K outlays by
businesses that flowed into the NIPA.
Accounting Issues: How Does Y2K
Spending Map into the NIPA?
Given the remediation efforts noted above, it
seems probable that firms replaced a significant
amount of their stock of computers and software,
and spent a considerable amount of resources to
fix existing source code, in an effort to avoid disrup-
tions at the century date change. To see how difficult
estimating the direct result of Y2K-related spending
in the NIPA is, consider three different scenarios by
which Firm A could have undertaken its Y2K fix. 
Scenario 1. In the first scenario, suppose
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SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
17 See the minutes of the August 24, 1999, meeting of the Federal
Open Market Committee (<www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/
19990824.htm>). From the week ending December 1, 1999, to the
week ending February 2, 2000, surplus vault cash jumped from
$17.4 billion to $40.5 billion. As a share of total vault cash, surplus
cash surged to an all-time high of just over 50 percent.JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003      39
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Where Was the Investment Bust During the 2001 Recession? (Percentage Deviations from Trend)
Business Industrial  Transportation 
Recession period structures IPES equipment equipment Residential
1960:Q2 to 1961:Q1
Average deviation 1.90 3.83 2.53 –4.22 –6.44
High 3.55 7.88 11.74 5.35 –2.28
Low 0.67 –3.60 –7.35 –16.14 –8.76
High – Low 2.88 11.48 19.08 21.48 6.48
1969:Q4 to 1970:Q4
Average deviation 0.54 4.11 1.28 –12.16 –14.46
High 2.47 7.92 3.68 1.44 –8.64
Low –1.29 –0.80 –2.58 –32.48 –22.36
High – Low 3.76 8.72 6.26 33.92 13.72
1973:Q4 to 1975:Q1
Average deviation 3.97 7.18 8.73 –0.24 –12.82
High 7.92 9.29 13.25 12.73 5.32
Low –3.54 3.21 –3.33 –18.53 –35.85
High – Low 11.46 6.09 16.59 31.26 41.17
1981:Q3 to 1982:Q4
Average deviation 3.93 –3.92 –1.96 –14.43 –30.22
High 11.60 2.55 3.49 –2.99 –13.44
Low –4.24 –15.29 –10.70 –27.08 –40.88
High – Low 15.83 17.84 14.19 24.08 27.44
1990:Q3 to 1991:Q1
Average deviation 5.35 –0.95 –1.58 0.14 –13.33
High 8.20 0.14 1.53 2.78 –5.76
Low 3.26 –3.07 –4.03 –1.41 –20.73
High – Low 4.94 3.21 5.56 4.20 14.97
2001:Q1 to 2001:Q4
Average deviation –2.52 –7.22 –2.95 –10.50 –1.88
High 2.06 1.66 4.92 –7.57 –0.52
Low –10.76 –13.68 –9.92 –13.08 –3.63
High – Low 12.82 15.34 14.84 5.50 3.11
NOTE: Percentages are calculated as deviations from trend in chain-weighted dollars. The trend value is estimated from the Hodrick-
Prescott algorithm. See footnote 5. Sample period for Hodrick-Prescott calculations are 1947:Q1 to 2001:Q4 for all categories except
IPES, which begins in 1959:Q1.
Table 3mainframe computer code Y2K compliant. Bureau
of Economic Analysis methodology stipulates that
“software-related expenditures treated as investment
exclude maintenance and repair expenditures on
existing software, including expenditures to fix
so-called ‘Y2K’ problems.” Accordingly, if Firm A
reports these receipts as software maintenance
and repair, then there would be no corresponding
increase in software investment. However, if Firm
A reports these receipts as custom programming
services (custom software), then the effect is an
increase in software investment.18
Scenario 2. The same rationale holds if, instead
of contracting out the services in question, the firm
decided to hire additional workers for the task
(own-account software). In either case, though,
the $10 million in wages and salaries paid to the
employees would show up on the income side of
the NIPA. Thus, whether the $10 million shows up
as a final output on the product side or is treated
as an intermediate expense on the product side,
depends on how these receipts are reported.19
Scenario 3. Finally, assume instead that Firm A
decided to purchase new software (prepackaged
software) or new Y2K-compliant computers that
included embedded software. In this case, the new
equipment or software would be classified as new
investment even if the equipment or software it
replaced was fully depreciated. Fully ascertaining
what is a final product and what is an intermediate
expense is probably not possible because of data
limitations. That is, U.S. statistical agencies such
as the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau
of the Census have not published estimates of Y2K-
related spending. There are estimates, however, that
have been pieced together with the help of private
consultants. For example, the U.S. Department of
Commerce’s Economics and Statistics Administra-
tion, with the assistance of the International Data
Corporation, reported that nearly half (46 percent)
of worldwide Y2K spending reflected “internal”
efforts to “identify and diagnose the problem, espe-
cially in the case of embedded chips.”20 This frac-
tion is only a little more than a quarter (27 percent)
of total reflected “external” spending. Expenditures
on hardware (11 percent) and software (17 percent)
were also a little more than a quarter of the total
spending. Assuming that these percentages apply
to the United States and that they accurately reflect
the distribution of spending, then only about half
of total Y2K expenditures probably flowed into
the output of final goods and services, with the
remainder slotted as intermediate expenses.21
Y2K Cost Estimates
In testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, (then)
Federal Reserve Governor Edward Kelley noted that
a survey of corporate 10-K financial reports filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission by
Federal Reserve Board staff economists indicated
that “an educated guess of the sunk cost of Y2K
remedial efforts in the U.S. private sector might be
roughly $50 billion.”22 The aforementioned Econ-
omics and Statistics Administration report, citing
the study commissioned by the International Data
Corporation in October 1999, estimated that the
cost of public- and private-sector Y2K spending in
the United States from 1995 to 2001 was expected
to total $114 billion.23 In inflation-adjusted terms,
as Table 4 indicates, this amounted to roughly $131
billion.
If the numbers in Table 4 are a reasonable
approximation of the actual Y2K-related spending
that occurred, then the efforts of U.S. firms to ready
themselves for the century date change totaled a
bit less than 1.5 percent of GDP over this six-year
period. While fairly significant, it hardly seems to
have been a major event expenditure-wise, given
that it was spread out over several years. Second, if,
as conjectured above, only about half of Y2K expen-
ditures flowed into final output, then the potential
Y2K-related investment contribution to real GDP
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20 See Economic and Statistical Administration (1999, pp. 3-4).
21 A further complication is that, unlike the estimates of prepackaged
and custom software investment described in footnote 18 (commod-
ity flow method), own-account software investment is measured as
the sum of production costs (wage and non-wage) and the costs of
intermediate inputs. See Bureau of Economic Analysis (2000).
22 <www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/testimony/1998/19980428.htm>.
23 The Economic and Statistical Administration admitted that this esti-
mate was not precise. Accordingly, they place a confidence interval
of $50 billion around either side of their point estimate.
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18 In the NIPA, there are three types of software treated as a fixed invest-
ment: prepackaged, custom, and own-account. See Bureau of Economic
Analysis (2000). In non-benchmark years, investment for prepackaged
and custom software are extrapolated using industry receipts rather
than product-type receipts. For example, the Bureau of Economic
Analysis uses services receipts for a firm that classifies itself as a
custom software establishment to extrapolate (using the input-output
accounts) the NIPA output for custom software. The last input-output
benchmark is for 1992.
19 In the NIPA, it is assumed that intermediate expenses eventually
show up in final output.growth was much less, about 0.75 percentage points
(half of 1.45 percent). Finally, the bulk of the Y2K-
related spending occurred from 1997 to 1999 ($103.6
billion). Accordingly, the timing of the expenditures
suggests that the surge in IPES investment that
peaked in the fourth quarter of 2000 was probably
not driven by Y2K expenditures. Thus, while the
investment boom and bust was probably exacer-
bated by Y2K remediation efforts (and their subse-
quent cessation), it was more likely the result of
declines in the equity cost of capital or other busi-
ness cycle effects.24 This conclusion is similar to
that reached by the Bank of England, which reported
that in March 2000 only “a small minority of com-
panies were planning much lower IT investment
over the next two years than in the previous two
years.”25
CONCLUSION
A salient feature of the business cycle that
spanned from March 1991 to the end of 2002 (the
National Bureau of Economic Research Committee
has yet to identify the trough) was the high-tech
investment boom and bust. Several explanations
have been offered for this development, including
the acceleration in labor productivity—the so-called
“New Economy” story—and the stock market surge
and subsequent collapse. One explanation that has
not been scrutinized in detail was the spending by
businesses to ready themselves for the century date
change. Because many information processing
systems and much of the hardware and software
were not Y2K compliant as late as early 1998, it
was thought that business investment in high-tech
E&S would increase appreciably to fix this problem—
hence, leading to a Y2K-related investment boom
in the late 1990s. Although solid data are lacking,
the evidence presented in this paper indicates that
the investment boom and bust was more than a
Y2K event.
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